Rachel Fain is an associate in the Insurance and Litigation Practice Groups at Halloran & Sage. Ms. Fain focuses her practice on defending personal injury cases, including those involving automobile, general and premises liability, as well as professional liability matters. Her experience includes handling all aspects of the proceedings from inception to conclusion in both state and federal courts. Ms. Fain's practice also includes complex civil and business litigation, including commercial and product liability. Additionally, she defends subrogation matters and assists in the defense of medical malpractice claims. Ms. Fain has second chair experience in numerous trials before Connecticut Courts.
Ms. Fain has successfully defended several clients in which their exposure was in excess of $500,000. Ms. Fain also has extensive experience in alternative dispute resolution involving cases of varying complexity.
Prior to joining the firm, Ms. Fain was an associate at a Hartford area defense firm where she practiced in the areas of personal injury. She attended Western New England College School of Law where she served as the Assistant Symposium Editor for the Western New England Law Review.
|Reported Cases||Representative Matters: H & S Secures Judgment for State Marshal; In Hill v. Ocwen Financial Group, et al, FST CV126013409S (May 21, 2013), the plaintiffs alleged that they were wrongfully evicted. They claimed that there was a bankruptcy stay in place which should have prevented the eviction, that certain personal belongings were destroyed, lost or stolen during the eviction and that they suffered emotional harm. They charged various lending institutions and the state marshal who executed the eviction with negligence, trespass, negligent infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and CUTPA violations.; Halloran & Sage ( H&S ), represented by Laura Pascale Zaino and Rachel Fain, vigorously responded with a comprehensive motion to strike the entire Complaint against the marshal. Relying primarily on Connecticut General Statute 6-38a(b), which protects marshals from liability for negligence and trespass in performing their duties, H&S challenged all of the counts on grounds that, despite how they were titled, each sounded in negligence and/or trespass. H&S also argued, among other things, that there is no cause of action for punitive damages.; The trial court (Adams, J.) agreed that Connecticut General Statute 6-38a(b) was dispositive of the negligence, trespass, negligent infliction of emotional distress and CUTPA claims and granted the motion to strike those counts. The trial court also agreed that there is no cause of action for punitive damages but concluded the allegations in that count could be construed to state a claim for reckless conduct. As such, the court denied the motion to strike that count.; Undeterred, H&S moved for and secured judgment on the stricken counts, answered the Complaint and raised a statute of limitations defense. H&S then moved for summary judgment on grounds that the plaintiffs' action was not commenced within the two year statute of limitations set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-584. The plaintiffs had alleged that the eviction occurred on March 26, 2009. The marshal maintained that the eviction occurred on February 25, 2010. The Complaint was dated March 26, 2012 and served on the marshal on March 30, 2012. Thus, regardless of whether the eviction occurred on March 26, 2009 or February 25, 2010, the action was not commenced within two years thereof. The trial court (Povodator, J.) agreed, granted the motion and disposed of the sole remaining claim against the marshal.; 1The marshal argued that the emotional distress claims were not directed toward him.2In doing so, he recognized the marshal's argument that the NIED allegations were not directed to him and noted that [t]o the extent Freedman is a target, the claims of negligence must fail.3At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the March 26, 2009 date was probably inaccurate. However, he did not confirm that February 25, 2010 date the marshal espoused and attempted to establish through the submission of evidence was correct. The trial court did not resolve this apparent conflict because it did not have to.|