U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Notice Requirement In FMLA Regulations Ragsdale, Et Al. V. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc. Decided: March 19, 2002, Case No. 00-6029

by:
Charles D. Smith
Roetzel & Andress, A Legal Professional Association - Columbus Office

Douglas E. Spiker
Roetzel & Andress, A Legal Professional Association - Toledo Office

Robert E. Blackham
Roetzel & Andress, A Legal Professional Association - Cleveland Office

September 29, 2003

In yet another important decision in the area of employment law, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a regulation issued by the Labor Department concerning notice requirements under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"). The FMLA guarantees qualified employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year for certain illnesses or disabilities. The Labor Department previously issued regulations (29 CFR Sec. 825.700(a)) requiring employers to provide specific notice to these employees that a leave or absence will be designated as FMLA leave and counted against their 12-week entitlement. The regulation goes on to state that if the employer fails to provide such notice, any leave taken by the employee will not count towards their 12-week entitlement. In the Ragsdale case, the plaintiff accepted a 30-week medical leave under her employer's generous leave of absence policy for a serious illness. At the end of the 30 weeks, the plaintiff then requested additional leave or permission to come back to part-time work. The company refused her request and terminated the employee. She then filed suit alleging a violation of the notice provisions found in the Labor Department regulations governing the FMLA. The District Court and 8th Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the employer and found the regulations to be in conflict with the Act itself because it required the employer to grant the employee more than 12 weeks of FMLA leave in one year. Upon further appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the 8th Circuit and again ruled that the regulation, as written, violated the fundamental guarantees found under the FMLA. It was the Court's conclusion that the regulation basically, through its penalties, extended the leave provided to an employee beyond the 12 week maximum. The Court felt that there was absolutely no authority provided to the Labor Department to provide such a penalty and nothing in the legislation that would allow the Department of Labor to amend the amount of leave guaranteed under the law. In the context of the Ragsdale case, the Supreme Court's decision does make sense. The plaintiff had already received well over 12 weeks of leave through the employer's generous leave policy. Therefore, it was impossible for her to show that she had been prejudiced or impaired in any way by the company's failure to provide notice that the 30-week leave would count against her FMLA and leave rights. As stated by the Supreme Court: "Blind to the reality that she would have taken the entire 30-week absence even had Wolverine complied with the notice regulations, Sec. 825.700(A) required the company to give her 12 more weeks and rendered it liable under Sec. 2617 of the Act when it denied her request and terminated her." While this decision does provide employers with some relief in situations where their own policies provide leave beyond that required under the FMLA, it still does not relieve employers of the notice requirements found under the Act. In fact, the Court was careful to point out that if an employer fails to provide notice and an employee shows that by not receiving that notice he was restrained or denied the opportunity to exercise his FMLA rights, then a different result might occur. Even though the employee may have been off work for more than 12 weeks under the company's own disability leave policy. All employers should still make sure that they are in compliance with the FMLA regarding the posting of notice of the opportunity for FMLA leave within its facilities and in its policies and handbooks and also when designating FMLA leave for employees who are absent from work for an extended period of time for eligible events.

The views expressed in this document are solely the views of the author and not Martindale-Hubbell. This document is intended for informational purposes only and is not legal advice or a substitute for consultation with a licensed legal professional in a particular case or circumstance.