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Tax Court Finds Transfers of FLP Interests Do Not Qualify for the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion Because Gifts Were Not of Present Interests -- Price v. Commissioner, TC Memo 2010-2




by:
Proskauer Rose LLP - New York Office

 
February 18, 2010

Previously published on February 2010

This Tax Court decision provides guidance on the availability of the annual exclusion from gift tax under Section 2503(b) for gifts of interests in family limited partnerships.  It is an important case for anyone who plans to engage in this kind of gifting, and it calls for a careful review of the provisions of the partnership or LLC agreement. 

In 1976, Walter Price started a company, Diesel Power Equipment Company (“DPEC”), which distributed and serviced heavy equipment.  Some time later, Mr. Price made the decision to sell the business.  In 1997, he formed Price Investments Limited Partnership as a limited partnership and contributed to it the stock in DPEC and three parcels of commercial real estate.  When it was formed, the partnership was owned 1% by its general partner, Price Management Corp., 49.5% by the Walter Price Revocable Trust and 49.5% by Mr. Price’s wife’s revocable trust.  Price Management Corp. was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Price’s revocable trusts.

In 1998, the partnership sold the DPEC stock and invested the proceeds in marketable securities.  Over the next several years, each of Mr. and Mrs. Price gifted interests in the partnership to their children such that by 2002 the children’s cumulative interest in the partnership was 99%.  Gift tax returns were filed properly for each year, reporting zero gift tax because of the use of annual exclusion and unified credit amounts.  Valuation reports were attached to the gift tax returns indicating substantial discounts for lack of control and marketability (which the IRS stipulated were reported correctly).

The IRS issued the Prices deficiency notices disallowing the use of the gift tax annual exclusion under Section 2503(b) with respect to the transferred partnership interests on the ground that the gifts were of “future interests in property.”  The Prices argued that their gifts were of present interests because (i) the donees could freely transfer the interests to one another or to the general partner and (ii) each donee had immediate rights to partnership income and could freely assign income rights to third persons.  Relying on Hackl, the IRS argued that the transferred partnership interests were future interests because the partnership agreement effectively barred transfers to third parties and did not require income distributions to the limited partners. 

The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and applied the methodology of Hackl in concluding that the Prices failed to show that their gifts conferred upon the donees the immediate use, possession or enjoyment of either (i) the transferred property or (ii) the income therefrom.

In its analysis of the “transferred property” prong, the court focused on the terms of the partnership agreement.  Specifically, the court notes that the donees have no unilateral right to withdraw their capital accounts; that their rights to transfer and assign partnership interests are restricted; and that a transferee is a mere assignee rather than a substitute limited partner.  The Tax Court, citing Hackl, states that transfers subject to the contingency of approval cannot support a present interest characterization. 

In its analysis of whether the gifts of the partnership interests afforded the donees the immediate use, possession or enjoyment of “the income therefrom,” the court held that (1) the partnership would have needed to generate income at or near the time of the gifts; (2) some portion of that income would have to have flowed steadily to the donees; and (3) the portion of income flowing to the donees had to be readily ascertainable.  The Court found that the partnership’s income did not flow steadily to the donees since there were no distributions in certain years.  Furthermore, the court found problematic the fact that neither the partnership nor the general partner had any obligation to distribute profits, and distributions were secondary to the primary purpose of the partnership in achieving a reasonable, compounded rate of return on a long-term basis.



 

The views expressed in this document are solely the views of the author and not Martindale-Hubbell. This document is intended for informational purposes only and is not legal advice or a substitute for consultation with a licensed legal professional in a particular case or circumstance.
 

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