• Recent Federal Court Ruling Indicates Coverage for LGBTQ-Related Conditions Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
  • July 10, 2017 | Author: Christopher R. Fontan
  • Law Firm: Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, PLLC - Jackson Office
  • In May 2017, a federal district court judge from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) may cover “gender dysphoria,” as well as other conditions related to “gender identity disorder.” Though seen as a departure from previously established law, this ruling could open the door to expanding employment protections to some transgender individuals under the ADA.

    What is “Gender Dysphoria”

    By now, the term “transgender” is a common term in our national vocabulary. “Transgender” is an umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or gender expression is different from cultural expectations placed on them due to their biologically-assigned birth gender. An issue more and more transgender individuals are seeking treatment for is known as “gender dysphoria.” The Human Rights Campaign defines “gender dysphoria” as “clinically significant distress caused when a person’s biologically-assigned birth gender is not the same, or does not match, the gender with which that person “identifies.”

    Historical Treatment of LGBTQ Issues under the ADA

    Historically, the ADA has not recognized LGBTQ-related conditions as covered disabilities. Specifically, Section 12211 of the ADA contains a number of exclusions—including “homosexuality” and “bisexuality” on the grounds that they are not “impairments” at all. The ADA also excludes “transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.”

    “Transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments” seem to be 1990s-era terms for the state of being what we call today “transgender.” And based on the other conditions that “transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders” are grouped with, it appears that in 1990, Congress considered these to be “anti-social” behaviors. Other “anti-social” behaviors not covered under the ADA include peeping, child molestation, compulsive stealing, and compulsively setting things on fire.

    Recent Third Circuit Ruling – Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.

    On August 15, 2014, a transgender woman filed Title VII and ADA claims against her former employer, claiming that she had suffered disability discrimination and retaliation based on her “gender dysphoria.” In her case (styled Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822-JLS), the plaintiff alleged that her gender dysphoria was characterized by clinically significant stress and substantially limited one or more of her major life activities, including but not limited to, interacting with others, reproducing, and social and occupational functions.

    The employer sought early dismissal of the ADA claims on the grounds that gender identity disorders are expressly excluded from coverage under Section 12211 of the ADA. In response, the plaintiff argued that excluding gender dysphoria from ADA protection violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—a particularly novel argument in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court, including the 2015 gay marriage opinion (Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). However, the district court judge sidestepped this Equal Protection issue altogether.

    Instead, the judge ruled that a plaintiff’s “gender dysphoria” could be an ADA-protected disability—despite the language in Section 12211 excluding “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments”— if the dysphoria caused “clinically significant stress and other impairments.” In reaching its holding, the court noted that two categories of conditions are explicitly excluded from protection under the ADA: (1) non-disabling conditions concerning sexual orientation and identity (e.g., homosexuality and bisexuality), and (2) conditions associated with harmful or illegal conduct (e.g., pedophilia and kleptomania). The court then narrowly interpreted these exceptions and found that the ADA does not exclude protection of “conditions that are actually disabling but that are not associated with harmful or illegal conduct” – such as the gender dysphoria affecting the plaintiff.

    In other words, the court ruled that a person with an ADA-excluded condition may also have medical conditions that are covered by the ADA. For many commentators, the judge relied on solid ADA-rationale applied to other conditions. For example, pregnancy is not an ADA-protected disability in itself. But if a pregnant woman develops a related condition such as preeclampsia (high blood pressure associated with pregnancy that can result in a stroke or permanent liver damage), she may have a protected disability based on the pregnancy-related medical condition, although not based on the pregnancy itself. Similarly, although homosexuality is not an ADA-protected disability, a gay man with HIV would have a disability based on the HIV condition.

    Using the Blatt court’s rationale, a transgender individual with “gender dysphoria” would be no different. For example, clinical depression caused by discrimination against an individual because he/she was transgender would clearly qualify as an ADA-protected condition under the rationale used in Blatt. Conversely, the individual’s transgender status—in and of itself—would not be entitled to ADA protection, as that is clearly excluded under Section 12211.

    The court also noted that its interpretation of the ADA is consistent with the Third Circuit’s mandate that the ADA is “a remedial statute, designed to eliminate discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society. . . [and] must be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes.” Thus, the judge wrote any exceptions in the ADA “should be read narrowly in order to permit the statute to achieve a broad reach.”

    This is yet another case in a recent wave of litigation concerning protections for LGBTQ individuals under the federal employment statutes. This ADA challenge represents a different approach to gender equity litigation that will warrant close monitoring to see how it impacts the development of jurisprudence—especially since it remains to be seen if the defendant will appeal the ruling, or if other jurisdictions will apply the Blatt rationale. In the meantime, employers should be mindful of their duties under the ADA to accommodate disabling impairments, even if the underlying condition is arguably not covered by the ADA.